大師向中國經濟開砲了！

諾貝爾獎的經濟學家克魯格曼開砲了，說北京是不擇手段，唯錢是問的重商主義（Mercantilism）者。這種指控，用白話說，就是為了錢，利益，賣爹、賣娘、賣妻、賣女都可以。

這下北京有得政治動作可搞。但對華府而言，大師的話會被當作急進派，而也不切實際。畢竟華府是政治玩家的俱樂部。政客們就是不喜歡是非黑白搞的一清二楚，永遠是是而非，永遠曖昧，永遠言詞鐗鐗有力，但卻不知內容是啥。

另一方面，華府也鐵定鴨子划水地加緊保護主義的措施，包括號召美國外商往印度、巴西、墨西哥與本土移動，同時也加緊各樣對中國進口貨物的稅率懲罰。

最明顯的就是，如今在北美洲的最大的零售商Walmart上櫃的貨品已經出現許多過去不曾看過的產地，有瓜地馬拉，有印度，有斯里蘭卡，有- - - - 等等的貨品。在過去十年內，這些都非 Made in China是不可能的。

《紐約時報》專欄作家保羅•克魯格曼12月31日發表專欄文章《屬於中國的新年》(Chinese New Year)，反映出在美國如何應對中國貿易順差的討論中一種越來越怨忿的情緒。這位獲得過諾貝爾獎的經濟學家不顧主流經濟學界普遍認同的自由貿易，贊成用保護主義來解決美國就業不足的問題，基本上是在問中國有沒有膽量通過大量拋售其美國國債儲備來做出反應。

專欄文章完全推翻了有關美中貿易關係的固有思路。幾十年以來，研究經濟學的人都被一再灌輸，1929年正是以臭名昭著的“斯姆特－霍利關稅”(Smoot-Hawley Tariff)為代表的日益升級的貿易保護主義，把全球經濟送進了棺材。克魯格曼用贊成的口吻引述最近去世的凱恩斯派經濟學家薩繆爾森(Paul Samuelson)的話說，當就業“低於充分水準”時，重商主義政策實際上是恰當的。

同樣，北京拋售所持大量美國國債的可能性常常被視為一種在世界末日才會發生的事情，克魯格曼對這一前景卻頗為樂觀。他在文章中說，中國這樣做，可能會讓美元對其他貨幣貶值，但這對美國的競爭力和就業來講，是好事而不是壞事；所以如果中國人真的大量拋售了美元，我們應該跟他們說聲謝謝。

讀者或許希望克魯格曼提出更多的證據來支持自己的論點。但除了簡短地引用薩繆爾森的話以外，他基本上沒有解釋為什麼保護主義是就業不足的恰當應對措施。他還說，中國購買美國債券的行為對美國利率影響不大甚至沒有影響。估計很多經濟學家會對此持不同意見。

令人吃驚的是，新年伊始，美國最受推崇、影響力最大的經濟學家之一實質上在喊著要和中國打一場貿易戰。克魯格曼這些主張與工會和某些議員多年來所說的很相似，而這些主張常常為重要經濟學家所駁斥。克魯格曼稱中國的匯率政策是“重商主義的”，是“掠奪性的”，語調之尖銳，比得上任何一位反華派議員。這場辯論的方向似乎已經發生了變化，而且對中國不利。

Aaron Back

It’s the season when pundits traditionally make predictions about the year ahead. Mine concerns international economics: I predict that 2010 will be the year of China . And not in a good way.

Actually, the biggest problems with China involve climate change. But today I want to focus on currency policy.

China has become a major financial and trade power. But it doesn’t act like other big economies. Instead, it follows a mercantilist policy, keeping its trade surplus artificially high. And in today’s depressed world, that policy is, to put it bluntly, predatory.

Here’s how it works: Unlike the dollar, the euro or the yen, whose values fluctuate freely, China’s currency is pegged by official policy at about 6.8 yuan to the dollar. At this exchange rate, Chinese manufacturing has a large cost advantage over its rivals, leading to huge trade surpluses.

Under normal circumstances, the inflow of dollars from those surpluses would push up the value of China ’s currency, unless it was offset by private investors heading the other way. And private investors are trying to get into China , not out of it. But China ’s government restricts capital inflows, even as it buys up dollars and parks them abroad, adding to a $2 trillion-plus hoard of foreign exchange reserves.

This policy is good for China ’s export-oriented state-industrial complex, not so good for Chinese consumers. But what about the rest of us?

In the past, China’s accumulation of foreign reserves, many of which were invested in American bonds, was arguably doing us a favor by keeping interest rates low — although what we did with those low interest rates was mainly to inflate a housing bubble. But right now the world is awash in cheap money, looking for someplace to go. Short-term interest rates are close to zero; long-term interest rates are higher, but only because investors expect the zero-rate policy to end some day. China ’s bond purchases make little or no difference.

Meanwhile, that trade surplus drains much-needed demand away from a depressed world economy. My back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that for the next couple of years Chinese mercantilism may end up reducing U.S. employment by around 1.4 million jobs.

The Chinese refuse to acknowledge the problem. Recently Wen Jiabao, the prime minister, dismissed foreign complaints: “On one hand, you are asking for the yuan to appreciate, and on the other hand, you are taking all kinds of protectionist measures.” Indeed: other countries are taking (modest) protectionist measures precisely because China refuses to let its currency rise. And more such measures are entirely appropriate.

Or are they? I usually hear two reasons for not confronting China over its policies. Neither holds water.

First, there’s the claim that we can’t confront the Chinese because they would wreak havoc with the U.S. economy by dumping their hoard of dollars. This is all wrong, and not just because in so doing the Chinese would inflict large losses on themselves. The larger point is that the same forces that make Chinese mercantilism so damaging right now also mean that China has little or no financial leverage.

Again, right now the world is awash in cheap money. So if China were to start selling dollars, there’s no reason to think it would significantly raise U.S. interest rates. It would probably weaken the dollar against other currencies — but that would be good, not bad, for U.S. competitiveness and employment. So if the Chinese do dump dollars, we should send them a thank-you note.

Second, there’s the claim that protectionism is always a bad thing, in any circumstances. If that’s what you believe, however, you learned Econ 101 from the wrong people — because when unemployment is high and the government can’t restore full employment, the usual rules don’t apply.

Let me quote from a classic paper by the late Paul Samuelson, who more or less created modern economics: “With employment less than full ... all the debunked mercantilistic arguments” — that is, claims that nations who subsidize their exports effectively steal jobs from other countries — “turn out to be valid.” He then went on to argue that persistently misaligned exchange rates create “genuine problems for free-trade apologetics.” The best answer to these problems is getting exchange rates back to where they ought to be. But that’s exactly what China is refusing to let happen.

The bottom line is that Chinese mercantilism is a growing problem, and the victims of that mercantilism have little to lose from a trade confrontation. So I’d urge China ’s government to reconsider its stubbornness. Otherwise, the very mild protectionism it’s currently complaining about will be the start of something much bigger.

不吐不快 - 大家一起來
作者 Ajin
2010-01-08
諾貝爾獎的經濟學家克魯格曼開砲了，說北京是不擇手段，唯錢是問的重商主義（Mercantilism）者。這種指控，用白話說，就是為了錢，利益，賣爹、賣娘、賣妻、賣女都可以。這下北京有得政治動作可搞。但對華府而言，大師的話會被當作急進派，而也不切實際。畢竟華府是政治玩家的俱樂部。政客們就是不喜歡是非黑白搞的一清二楚，永遠是是而非，永遠曖昧，永遠言詞鐗鐗有力，但卻不知內容是啥。然而，華府這些老道也不是省油的：一方面會刻意表現不理睬克魯格曼的炮轟，也會很誠意地向北京安撫說: 「咱們不要裡這位瘋子狂人，咱們繼續玩好朋友，安心吧，錢盡量賺，你賺，我賺，大家都爽！」另一方面，華府也鐵定鴨子划水地加緊保護主義的措施，包括號召美國外商往印度、巴西、墨西哥與本土移動，同時也加緊各樣對中國進口貨物的稅率懲罰。最明顯的就是，如今在北美洲的最大的零售商Walmart上櫃的貨品已經出現許多過去不曾看過的產地，有瓜地馬拉，有印度，有斯里蘭卡，有- - - - 等等的貨品。在過去十年內，這些都非 Made in China是不可能的。底下欣賞一下克魯格曼這位經濟大師如何修理北京政府吧！來源：http://cn.wsj.com/gb/20100105/rec123201.asp 2010年 01月 05日 12:28 克魯格曼：和中國打一場貿易戰吧《紐約時報》專欄作家保羅•克魯格曼12月31日發表專欄文章《屬於中國的新年》(Chinese New Year)，反映出在美國如何應對中國貿易順差的討論中一種越來越怨忿的情緒。這位獲得過諾貝爾獎的經濟學家不顧主流經濟學界普遍認同的自由貿易，贊成用保護主義來解決美國就業不足的問題，基本上是在問中國有沒有膽量通過大量拋售其美國國債儲備來做出反應。專欄文章完全推翻了有關美中貿易關係的固有思路。幾十年以來，研究經濟學的人都被一再灌輸，1929年正是以臭名昭著的“斯姆特－霍利關稅”(Smoot-Hawley Tariff)為代表的日益升級的貿易保護主義，把全球經濟送進了棺材。克魯格曼用贊成的口吻引述最近去世的凱恩斯派經濟學家薩繆爾森(Paul Samuelson)的話說，當就業“低於充分水準”時，重商主義政策實際上是恰當的。同樣，北京拋售所持大量美國國債的可能性常常被視為一種在世界末日才會發生的事情，克魯格曼對這一前景卻頗為樂觀。他在文章中說，中國這樣做，可能會讓美元對其他貨幣貶值，但這對美國的競爭力和就業來講，是好事而不是壞事；所以如果中國人真的大量拋售了美元，我們應該跟他們說聲謝謝。讀者或許希望克魯格曼提出更多的證據來支持自己的論點。但除了簡短地引用薩繆爾森的話以外，他基本上沒有解釋為什麼保護主義是就業不足的恰當應對措施。他還說，中國購買美國債券的行為對美國利率影響不大甚至沒有影響。估計很多經濟學家會對此持不同意見。令人吃驚的是，新年伊始，美國最受推崇、影響力最大的經濟學家之一實質上在喊著要和中國打一場貿易戰。克魯格曼這些主張與工會和某些議員多年來所說的很相似，而這些主張常常為重要經濟學家所駁斥。克魯格曼稱中國的匯率政策是“重商主義的”，是“掠奪性的”，語調之尖銳，比得上任何一位反華派議員。這場辯論的方向似乎已經發生了變化，而且對中國不利。 *Aaron Back* 紐約時報的英文原文： http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/01/opinion/01krugman.html?th&emc=th Chinese New Year By PAUL KRUGMAN Published: December 31, 2009 It’s the season when pundits traditionally make predictions about the year ahead. Mine concerns international economics: I predict that 2010 will be the year of China . And not in a good way. Skip to next paragraphActually, the biggest problems with China involve climate change. But today I want to focus on currency policy. China has become a major financial and trade power. But it doesn’t act like other big economies. Instead, it follows a mercantilist policy, keeping its trade surplus artificially high. And in today’s depressed world, that policy is, to put it bluntly, predatory. Here’s how it works: Unlike the dollar, the euro or the yen, whose values fluctuate freely, China’s currency is pegged by official policy at about 6.8 yuan to the dollar. At this exchange rate, Chinese manufacturing has a large cost advantage over its rivals, leading to huge trade surpluses. Under normal circumstances, the inflow of dollars from those surpluses would push up the value of China ’s currency, unless it was offset by private investors heading the other way. And private investors are trying to get into China , not out of it. But China ’s government restricts capital inflows, even as it buys up dollars and parks them abroad, adding to a $2 trillion-plus hoard of foreign exchange reserves. This policy is good for China ’s export-oriented state-industrial complex, not so good for Chinese consumers. But what about the rest of us? In the past, China’s accumulation of foreign reserves, many of which were invested in American bonds, was arguably doing us a favor by keeping interest rates low — although what we did with those low interest rates was mainly to inflate a housing bubble. But right now the world is awash in cheap money, looking for someplace to go. Short-term interest rates are close to zero; long-term interest rates are higher, but only because investors expect the zero-rate policy to end some day. China ’s bond purchases make little or no difference. Meanwhile, that trade surplus drains much-needed demand away from a depressed world economy. My back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that for the next couple of years Chinese mercantilism may end up reducing U.S. employment by around 1.4 million jobs. The Chinese refuse to acknowledge the problem. Recently Wen Jiabao, the prime minister, dismissed foreign complaints: “On one hand, you are asking for the yuan to appreciate, and on the other hand, you are taking all kinds of protectionist measures.” Indeed: other countries are taking (modest) protectionist measures precisely because China refuses to let its currency rise. And more such measures are entirely appropriate. Or are they? I usually hear two reasons for not confronting China over its policies. Neither holds water. First, there’s the claim that we can’t confront the Chinese because they would wreak havoc with the U.S. economy by dumping their hoard of dollars. This is all wrong, and not just because in so doing the Chinese would inflict large losses on themselves. The larger point is that the same forces that make Chinese mercantilism so damaging right now also mean that China has little or no financial leverage. Again, right now the world is awash in cheap money. So if China were to start selling dollars, there’s no reason to think it would significantly raise U.S. interest rates. It would probably weaken the dollar against other currencies — but that would be good, not bad, for U.S. competitiveness and employment. So if the Chinese do dump dollars, we should send them a thank-you note. Second, there’s the claim that protectionism is always a bad thing, in any circumstances. If that’s what you believe, however, you learned Econ 101 from the wrong people — because when unemployment is high and the government can’t restore full employment, the usual rules don’t apply. Let me quote from a classic paper by the late Paul Samuelson, who more or less created modern economics: “With employment less than full ... all the debunked mercantilistic arguments” — that is, claims that nations who subsidize their exports effectively steal jobs from other countries — “turn out to be valid.” He then went on to argue that persistently misaligned exchange rates create “genuine problems for free-trade apologetics.” The best answer to these problems is getting exchange rates back to where they ought to be. But that’s exactly what China is refusing to let happen. The bottom line is that Chinese mercantilism is a growing problem, and the victims of that mercantilism have little to lose from a trade confrontation. So I’d urge China ’s government to reconsider its stubbornness. Otherwise, the very mild protectionism it’s currently complaining about will be the start of something much bigger. Source: 椰子樹下打盹的哲學家 Tweet